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"Security is indivisible and the security of 
participating state is ineeparably linked to that of all the 
others/"
— The Charter of Paris for a Hew Europe
(1990)
The driving force of all of the European states, since the end 
of the second World War has been security. While the "East" and 
"West" "Blocs" were separated, security was a matter for the 
superpowers and their individual military organizations, NATO, and 
the Warsaw Pact. However, since 1989 and the "fall" of "Eastern 
Europe" security has again become, for the present, a wholly 
national concern. That is not to say that during the "Cold War" 
countries did not think about security, it is to say that circum­
stances have changed and the security structures of the "East" had 
been dismantled. Whether within the context of collective European 
security, or the twin pillars of European collective security and 
the security of an individual country, countries are beginning to 
view the future of Europe as one of cooperation and interdepen­
dency. A year or so ago, war in Europe seemed unlikely, after all, 
the cold war had just been declared to be over, but in the Balkans, 
the prospect of war was beginning to reach ever heightening stages 
of brinkmanship. The civil war in Yugoslavia has revised the 
concept of "indivisible security" in Europe, and also has chal­
lenged all the countries of Europe to "link" their foreign policies 
in order to attempt to resolve the dispute.
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As the year 1991 came to an m '1, the countriis of Central and 
Eastern Europe feared: the instability of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and Yugoslavia; the regular flow of 
refugees, both economic and those fleeing the conflicts in Yugosla* 
via and the former Soviet union; the consequences upon their 
economies resulting from the virtual collapse of the Soviet economy 
and trading system; and the potentiality of political pressure from 
Moscow. It appears that this last fear, although not unfounded, 
will not be realized.
In an effort to prevent instability within their own develop­
ing democracies and economies, the former Bloc countries have 
applied to various European institutions. Their successes in 
achieving guarantees of their security and economic systems vary 
according to their visible achievements in democratization.
By the end of 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary became 
full members of the Council of Europe, while Bulgaria and Romania 
had only observer status. All the Central and Eastern European 
countries (with the exception of Romania and Albania), had observer 
status in NATO's Assembly, and had contacts with the Western 
European Union. As for their relative economic security, Czecho­
slovakia, Hungary, and Poland all achieved associate membership 
into the European Community. Their applications for full member­
ship will likely be taken up after European Unification.
Other ideas have been proposed, and some already accepted, 
such as: greater cooperation between political and military 
experts on the issues of an all European security strategy and
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policy; and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Germafi foreign 
Minister Genscher proposed a NATO Cooperation Council (HACC) . This 
HACC will be used as a forum for political and military discussions 
between Western, East European, and Soviet (now CIS) officiali. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the
resulting reverberations that have occurred in Europe and around 
the globe shows that there is a need for even greater efforts to 
secure stability and peace in Eastern Europe, and Europe in 
general*
The Yugoslav civil war has created, as Dutch Foreign Minister 
Hans Van den Broek said, "a test case for Europe” • By looking at 
as many countries as possible, individually, the European interna­
tional organizations, and the former "Eastern Bloc” stater, 1 will 
show both the general policies and some of the various stratagems 
which the European states have employed in order to cope with the 
Yugoslav conflict. This conflict that would test not only the 
political institutions of Europe, but also put to the test Europe's 
ability, or inability to create and maintain security throughout 
the European continent. Coupled with security are the difficult 
problems of ethno-terrir.orial sub-nationalism, and the questions of 
self-determination and the rights of minorities, as Europe begins 
to walk the path towards European integration.
In finding a way to tackle such an immense foreign policy 
discussion, in such a way as to integrate not only the individual 
countries, but the international organizations these countries are 
involved in, there will be one large exclusion, the United States.
Although the u.s. did have an etfeot on the initial policy line of 
maintaining Yugoslavia's "unity and territorial integrity", liter 
on their input and influence was predominantly peripheral and 
ineffectual. Also, the participation of the United nations will be 
discussed only in the setting of how the problem was brought to it. 
Therefore the discussion of the peace-keeping forces will only be 
mentioned in relation to the individual European participants.
The countries of Western Europe have been trying to work in 
concert (with the relative exception of Greece); therefore, they 
will be discussed together with the trappings of their internation­
al organizations, the European Community (EC), the Western European 
Union (WEU) , and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE).
Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union (When discussing 
what occurred after the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, I will 
only refer to Russia due to its position in the United Nations.), 
and Greece, because of its geographical proximity and its geo­
political relations to Yugoslavia, will initially be discussed 
separately from the rest of Europe, but will, throughout the course 
of the thesis be integrated into the rest of the European discus­
sion.
The country of Austria will be discussed in terms of both the 
"Western" nations, due to its political philosophy, and with the 
"Eastern" countries, because it lies geographically on the border 
of Yugoslavia and thus has concerns peculiar to its geographical 
location.
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As the conflict is ongoing, I will conclude the discussion 
with the recognition of SIoveaia and Croatia on January 15, 1992, 
and the subsequent reactions of sees of the European states to this 
recognition.
I
In 1990, Yugoslavia, one of the last Communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe held “free, democratic and multi-party” 
elections. Some, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
and Macedonia, held elections which were generally more “democrat­
ic", and less coercive than those held in Montenegro and Serbia. 
Beginning with the March 1990 elections in Slovenia and Croatia, 
through December when Serbia held their elections, talks were 
occurring between republican leaders on the future configuration of 
the country.
In January of 1991, Slovenia made an announcement that unless 
a political solution on the future of the country was completed 
within the next six months, they would use the mechanism from the 
1974 Constitution and begin a process of dissociation from 
Yugoslavia with the goal of full independence. Weekly inter­
republican meetings, such as those that had been taking place for 
the last twelve months, continued for the next six months. As time 
wore on and no political resolution occurred (Meanwhile, the 
Serbian government called out the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) to 
crush demonstrations that occurred in Belgrade between March 9th
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and March 14th.), Slovenia, and by this time Croatia, made their 
intentions clear; they would announce their decision to dissociate 
in the last week of June. Five days prior to the announcements by 
ildvenia and Croatia, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Loncar briefed 
the CSCE on the conditions within his country and urged the body to 
issue a statement. Luxembourg's Foreign Minister (FM) Jacques Poos 
made a motion to this effect and it was agreed that a joint 
statement would be issued "supporting the democratic development, 
unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia based on economic 
reforms and the unrestricted application of human rights in alt 
regions of Yugoslavia" fFBIS-WEU, 20.June.1991, p.1, 3). One day 
before the declarations by Slovenia and Croatia, the EC foreign 
ministers agreed not to recognize any unilateral declaration of 
independence by Slovenia or Croatia. The Community President (at 
that time) Jacques Poos (Luxembourg) stated that the EC would not 
conduct any high level contacts with Slovenia and Croatia if they 
left the Yugoslav federation (FBIS-WEU. 24.June.1991; p.l). The 
announcements came on June 25, 1991. After a day of uneasy quiet, 
the YPA forces opened fire in Slovenia, in a botched attempt to 
secure the borders of the former Yugoslav state.
II
'•Unity", "territorial integrity", and "maintaining the 
Yugoslav federation" were the words Europe used to describe what 
they saw as the only viable solution to the tensions emanating from
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the Yugoslav republics in the first six months of 1991. Finding 
such a political solution would have allowed the six republics and 
two "autonomous" provinces of the former Yugoslavia to come to a 
nice, simple and neat conclusion to the political and economic 
problems there. However, Europe would then not have been confront­
ed with their own political and security shortfalls. It gave the 
European Community, the member countries of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the United Nations 
an excellent opportunity to investigate, test, or retest the 
feasibility of their structures and mechanisms for preventing 
and/or solving what has become a quagmire in international 
peacemaking.
Both halves of Europe (West and East) have approached the 
problem of Yugoslavia from their own general biases. The West was 
still contending with the many political, economic, and social 
problems resulting from the revolutions of 1989: German reunifica­
tion; the continuing question of disarmament; the future role of 
NATO; the role of NATO vis-a-vis the CSCE and the potential for 
rivalry between these two institutions; the numerous questions and 
decisions that needed to be discussed regarding European Unifica­
tion, especially the idea of "Europe without borders"; refugees, 
both political and economic; the resurgence of fascism and racial 
tensions, to name but a few. With so many recent upheavals, it is 
understandable that most European states equated security with the 
idea of maintaining the "status quo". There was a fear of further 
upsetting a system that had been, until 1989, stable for more than
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forty years. Another reason for preserving the status quo was the 
Soviet Union. First, it was not known whether there would be 
military repercussions from the Soviet Union, but more importantly, 
the Western nations did not want to provide the precedent to the 
Soviet republics for disintegration of a multi-ethnic state. 
Looking to its own backyard, the West did not want to encourage 
separatist movements in Spain, Italy, or Great Britain. Nor did 
they relish the prospects of possibly destablizing new democracies 
like Czechoslovakia or Romania. Thus,  a unified Yugoslavia was 
desirable.
Gorbachev's Soviet Union was also an adherent to the "unifica­
tion” of Yugoslavia since it was standing on the same precipice 
(FBIS-EEU, 5.July.1991; p.4 ; 8.July.1991; p.40 ; 12.July.1991? 
p • 3 0) .
Yet the other new democracies of Eastern Europe had a slightly 
different perspective of the crisis facing Yugoslavia. They saw 
the desires of Slovenia and Croatia as similar to what they had 
just achieved, self-determination. They understood the difficul­
ties of living under Communist regimes. At the same time they were 
contending with their own political, economic and social problems, 
besides trying to bring about stability and security within their 
own borders and political systems.
The countries that border Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, lemeniat 
Italy, Greece, Albania, Hungary, and Austria (in Serbo-Croatian 
they form the acronym BRIGAMA or "Worries”), stated outright that 
they had no territorial claims upon the state if it came apart.
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However, they, themselves were now worried about the consequences 
of Yugoslav political dissolution.
All of the former eastern Bloc countries appeared to initially 
welcome the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, but then they 
hesitated. Although they felt that these two republics were 
following the principle of self-determination, the eastern Europe­
ans adopted policies that were self-preservationist in nature. 
With good reason, they did not want to jeopardize their relatively 
new international statuses, nor did they wish to step on the 
collective toes of the western Europeans by recognizing the two 
republics. After all they had been working very hard for the last 
two years for their own political stability, and for some, 
recognition could possibly disrupt this. Also, they were trying to 
gain entrance into the organizations of Western Europe, the EC, the 
Council of Europe, and NATO? and recognition was not the plan being 
put forth in the West. Consequently, with a few exceptions, the 
governments of Central and Eastern Europe decided to wait for the 
EC before recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. To put it simply and 
without attaching blame, their economic and international standing 
were of greater importance.
The exceptions were the Baltic states and former Soviet 
republic of Georgia. Lithuania was the first country to express 
support for Slovenia's bid for independence (mitjg IndiPtndlllt* 
July 12-18, 1991, p. 1), on July 3rd. By July 30th the Lithuanian 
parliament recognized both Slovenia and Croatia, stating that their 
drives for independence were "legitimate11, and that the two
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republics were exercising ••the will of their peoples and 'the 
universally recognized right of peoples to self-determination'M 
(ibid., August 2-9, 1991, p. 1). A few days later Latvia followed 
Lithuania's lead, with Estonia and Georgia recognizing only 
Slovenia (FBIS-EEU, 13.Aug.1991; p.32). This is a logical policy 
for these countries, considering that at this time they too were 
desiring to dissociate themselves from a multi-national state, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Ill
The Austrian government had been preparing for a possible 
breakup of Yugoslavia. Austria and Hungary, have historical, 
economic and cultural links to both Slovenia and Croatia. Both 
countries were, before World War I, part of the Habsburg Empire, 
and the dual monarchy of Austro-Hungary. Austria's ties are more 
with Slovenia rather than with Croatia, due to the geographical 
proximity of Slovenia (they share a large common border), Austria 
had a great: economic and administrative influence over Slovenia 
while it was under their control and there is currently a large 
Slovenian minority residing in Austria, in the areas known as 
Carinthia and Styria. The reverse is true for Hungary. Croatia, 
once an integral part of Hungary, has a large area bordering 
Hungary (610 km) and there are still Croats living in Hungary. 
However, Hungary's main concern in the Yugoslav civil war has been 
the 450,000 ethnic Hungarians that live in the province of Vojvo-
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dina. Vojvodina is a province of Serbia. While there is no 
fighting currently in Vojvodina, Serbia has been calling up 
conscripts from the area. Also, due to the war in Croatia, the 
Adriatic oil pipeline on which Hungary was depending has been cut.
At the beginning of the conflict, Austria feared a large 
influx of refugees. Although the fighting in Slovenia was short­
lived, Austrians still worry about refugees, from Croatia, via 
either Slovenia or Hungary. Hungary on the other hand has received 
many refugees. A conservative estimate is about 40,000 refugees in 
Hungary and 12,000 in Austria, although not all of them are 
registered. Also, Hungary has received deserters from the Yugoslav 
People's Army (YPA) and other defectors from the armed services, 
especially Hungarian conscripts.
As Foreign Minister (FM) Alios Mock related in an interview on 
June 26t:h, Austria has, "since last fall...been drawing the 
attention of our Western friends to this dangerous situation. The 
danger has simply been underestimated." (FBIS-WEU, June 26, 1991; 
p.3) In March, 1991, FM Mock was advocating quick recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia if they decided to secede from the Yugoslav 
federation (ibid.). By spring, Slovenia and Croatia had already 
opened embryonic diplomatic missions in Vienna, and later the two 
republics opened "offices" in other Western cities. Also, i n  early 
1991, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman went to Vienna for an 
informal State visit.
As with Yugoslavia's other neighbors and before the June 
declarations, Italy's Foreign Minister (FM) Gianni de hichelis
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tried to urge the EC to encourage the Yugoslav republics to at 
least remain united when it came to international relations fReport 
on Eastern Europe. 51/52*) if they would not maintain the federal 
structure or create a confederal arrangement.
In general Austria and Hungary had been waiting for the 
European Community (or Germany) to recognize Slovenia and Croatia* 
Both countries realized that to unilaterally recognize the 
republics would not help either republic if there was no interna­
tional support for the decision. Additionally there was a domestic 
reason why they did not want to preempt an European Community (EC) 
decision; Austria has an application for membership with the EC 
pending consideration, and Hungary was hoping to gain Associate 
status.
However, both Austria and Hungary did agree to recognize 
travel documents from the two republics, stating that while they 
did so, they were not conferring formal diplomatic recognition at 
that time. By fall, Italy's stance changed had also to preparing 
for what was felt to be Slovenia's and Croatia's eventual full 
independence. At this time, Italy stated it would recognize 
Slovenia and Croatia passports **on humanitarian grounds** (Report on 
Eastern Europe. 51/52), but this would not constitute political 
recognition. All three countries were, and are, concerned about 
fighting spilling over their borders, refugees, and guaranteeing 
the rights of minorities within Slovenia and Croatia (FBIS-WEU, 
10.Oct.1991; p.4).
Austria began working through the international organize-
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tions of Europe once attacks were begun in Slovenia. FM Nock 
immediately invoked a mechanism of the CSCE "which allows a member 
government to request information on 'unusual military activities' 
in another state" (Weitz, p.25). When they received the explana­
tion from Belgrade it was considered insufficient. This allowed 
them to call an emergency meeting of the ministers to discuss the 
crisis. At the same time Austria was proposing, through Germany, 
to the European Community (EC), to have the EC send "a council of 
experts, a committee of mediators" (FBIS-WEU. June 26, 1991; p.3). 
From that point on, Austria continued to work closely with Germany, 
and later Italy, although all references to a Triple Alliance by 
Belgrade have been denied by all three countries.
One of the main reasons Austria has been working so closely 
with Germany has been because at the outset of the fighting there 
were discussions about whether the crisis should be referred to the 
CSCE or the EC. It was decided that the EC minister?* would send a 
high-level mediating mission, formed by Italian FM Gianni De 
Michel is, Luxembourg FM Jacques Poos and the Dutch FM Hans Van den 
Broek. (Later missions would be formed by FM Poos, FM Van den Broek 
and the Portuguese FM Joao de Deus Pinheiro.) And, it was also 
decided to invoke the mechanisms of the CSCE (FBIS-WEU. June 28, 
1991? p. 2).
In the days after the declarations, the EC and the nordic 
countries all made similar statements about the decision by 
Slovenia and Croatia. The statement by the Foreign Minister of 
Denmark, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen sums it up nicely; Denmark "under-
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stands the frustration felt by Yugoslavia's republics” (FBIS-WEU. 
27.June.1991; p. 31), but supported a unified Yugoslavia based on 
respect for human rights, economic reforms and a peaceful solution 
to the current problems.
The only country of Western Europe treading a slightly 
different path was Austria. FM Mock, citing that the preconditions 
for granting recognition under international law were not present 
in Slovenia and Croatia, stated that Austria would not recognize 
the republics ”for the time being” (FBIS-WEU. 26.June.1991? p. 3).
Germany's attitude, due much to their own public's outcry 
against the violence, changed by the 28th of June. At this time 
the German government decided that they, like Austria, would not 
”for the time being" recognize the republics, for the same reason 
of international law. However, Germany did attempt a "carrot and 
stick" approach to resolve the crisis. They tried to use Yugo­
slavia's desire for Associate membership in the EC as a lever to 
stop the fighting and bring about a peaceful resolution (ibid., 
p.11).
Other international organizations also made statements. Both 
NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) expressed their dismay at 
the Slovenian and Croatian declarations and encouraged "dialogue” 
(FBIS-WEU. 28.June.1991? p. 1).
* * * * *
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IV
Although the Western countries ended June in general agreement 
that Yugoslavia should remain whole (with the exceptions of Austria 
and Germany), from July to January these countries moved with 
varying speed to support recognizing the two republics. By early 
October the Western and Eastern nations were in agreement that 
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was not far off, "in private 
conversations everybody agrees that it is only a matter of how this 
can be done1' (FBIS-WEU, 3 .October. 1991; p.2). A month later, the 
Italian FM de Michelis released a communique from his meeting with 
Croatian FM Separovic, stating that:
"The peace process advanced in The Hague has no alterna­
tive....The process will conclude within two months time 
leading to the international recognition of the independence 
of Croatia, Slovenia, and any other republic which desire it. 
It is hoped that Serbia will follow this path, to avoid 
negative consequences and political and economic isolation...M 
(FBIS-WEU. 1.November.1991; p.17).
How all the states of Europe came to agree on recognition for 
Slovenia and Croatia is the "test case", about which Dutch minister 
Van den Broek spoke. It involves not only the desire of each 
country to resolve the crisis, but to reach the resolution with one 
"unified" voice. The European "test case" has also become a 
challenge to the United Nations, the peace-keeping force in
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Yugoslavia is the first to occur in continental Europe since the 
U.N. was founded (Shoup, p.17). Consequently, how this happened 
also shows how "European security” has become a puzzle to solve by 
the world body. The presence and mandate for the U.N. peace­
keeping forces are tied to the political resolution of the Yugoslav
the EC peace conference in The Hague.
A chronological examination is the most logical way to address 
how the countries of Europe used the Yugoslavian conflict as a 
forum for developing a common European foreign policy toward 
European security, and the Yugoslav conflict specifically.
In July and August there were signs of great differences 
within the "twelve" (the EC) . Various countries of Europe began 
aligning themselves into "factions", either favoring Slovenia and 
Croatia, or favoring unity. These fac ions were extremely 
malleable. By the end of August, Greece, Spain, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
and France were still supporting the unity of Yugoslavia, in
descending degrees--Greece being the most strident.
Austria began building a coalition of countries to support 
Slovenia and Croatia's bids for self-determination (FBIS-WEU. 3. 
July.1991; p.l). The first "convert" was Germany. FM Genscher 
within a week of his "conversion” said that he had "always insisted 
on self-determination, changes and a new Constitutional structures 
in Yugoslavia" (FBIS-WEU. 2.July.1991? p.18). Although recognition 
was not yet advisable, he astutely realized that "recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia does not remove all of the difficulties
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because it does not solve the problems of the various minerities in 
the individual republics.” (ibid.#.) . Norway and Switzerland were 
also members of Austria's coalition, supporting the self-determina­
tion Stance of the two republics.
Arrayed against this coalition were countries who disagreed 
With the "pro-recognition” faction for a variety of reasons. 
Greece was, and is, worried about the potentially disastrous 
affects on their country (internally with potential separatists, 
and the possibility of the war spilling over into Greece) . France 
was an ambiguous supporter of territorial integrity, but they also 
advocated sending CSCE observers and condemned the Yugoslav 
People's Army's (YPA's) violence in Slovenia and Croatia (FBIS-WEU, 
3.July.1991; p.l). The more "radical” proposals set out by Germany 
in both CSCE and EC meetings on the situation were blocked by 
France and sometimes the United Kingdom (FBIS-WEU. 5.July.1991? 
p.l) .
Portugal's FM Joao de Deus Pinheiro wanted to "keep up the 
initiatives, to keep up the pressure and even to find new formulas 
to resolve the crisis.” (ibid.. p.2). Consequently, he did not 
want to recognize the republics, fearing that this would sabotage 
the possibility for a "peaceful resolution”. Also, FM Pinheiro was 
to become the next President of the EC after FM Van den Broek's 
term ended at the end of 1991, and did not want to give the 
combatants any reason to think that he was prejudicial to any one 
of the parties.
Belgium and Italy were moving, albeit slowly, toward a greater
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emphasis on self-determination. Belgium FM Mark Eyskens was also 
trying to bring in the United Nations Security Council to mediate 
the dispute (ibid.; p.3). Italy's FM De Michelis looked at the 
separation of the republics like this: "...if there must be
Croatia's right to self-determination, there must also be a self- 
determination for the Serbian minority [in Croatia], A simplistic 
application of principles would be short-sighted and an unproduc­
tive brand of political realism." (ibid.. p.24).
The Swedes gave an encouraging "not yet" because the legal 
conditions for recognition had not been realized (ibid., p.31). 
Spain wanted the civilian power (the Yugoslav presidency) to be 
"recovered as soon as possible" (ibid.. p.29). Spain's FM 
Fernandez-Ordonez tried to explain that the divi ied stance of the 
EC was only limited to "tactics and strategies of approaching a 
political solution", but went on to say that "the Spanish posi­
tion. ..is to respect the principles of the Paris Charter and the 
Helsinki Act, which is the position of the '12'." (ibid.). A
contradictory position to be sure, but it is really exemplary of 
the confusion occurring in the capitals of Europe due to this first 
outbreak of war in Europe in more than forty-five years.
German FM Genscher attributed the hesitancy of France, Spain, 
the UK, and Italy to the volatile minorities within their own 
countries. Despite knowing this, he urged the EC to form a unified 
stance on the Yugoslav problem (FBIS-WEU. 8.July.1991? p.14).
EC President Jacques Delors (France), while admitting 
Yugoslavia was no longer maintaining a federation, believed that
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the international community must avoid having Yugoslavia split up 
(FBIS-WEU. 10.July.1991; p.l). The UK's statement that the EC 
should enable "'a certain correctness of borders between Serbia and 
Croatia'” and was "Strongly against any revision of Yugoslavia's 
internationally recognized borders” (FBIS-WEU, 12.July.1991; p.2) 
was the general position of the majority of the EC member states. 
Belgrade showed their approval of this attitude when Tanjug 
reported the statement as "Statement shows 'More flexible' SFRY 
Stance” (ibid.). This intransigence of the United Kingdom's, 
coupled with the waffling of France and the U.S. prompted the 
Serbian defence minister General Tomislav Simovic to state in an 
interview with the Zagreb independent weekly Globus, that ”'[i]t is 
no coincidence'...that their official policies ' are fair towards 
the Serbian question in Croatia.'” (East European Newslg.fct.feri p.7). 
As these former "great powers” continued to be indecisive they gave 
Serbia a psychological boost, and allowed the government in 
Belgrade to believe that their positions tallied with Serbia's.
At the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict an independent 
policy by Greece was unnecessary. The Greek government stood 100% 
behind the EC's idea of "preserving the Yugoslav federation”. Be­
sides, the issue of Cyprus has, since 1974, been of greater 
concern. The Greek government's primary concern at the beginning 
of the crisis was more for how the Yugoslav conflict would affect 
tourism and Greece's overland communications to Europe.
In August, Greece maintained, as it would until December, its 
attitude that Yugoslavia should remain unified and that the borders
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of the republics should remain constant (FBIS-WEU, 7.Aug.1991; 
P* 55).
The Spanish FM Fernandez-Ordonez "believe[d] that recognition 
of the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia 'as independent 
states' is technically and legally impossible at present.". 
Although not because he feared Basque separatists, but recalled 
that all of Europe had counted on the unity and integrity of 
Yugoslavia, and that several million lives have been lost in past 
wars over borders. Yet, though he did not believe this particular 
conflict would spread throughout Europe, he noted that it is 
already having "negative effects on the process of European unity" 
(FBIS-WEU. 14.Aug.1991; p.24).
The Swiss FM Rene Felber stepped out further than most 
supporters of Slovenia and Croatia in mid-August, stating that 
Switzerland would recognize the two republics "only if other 
nations of Europe take a similar step" (FBIS-WEU. 19.Aug.1991? 
p.29). Yet "recognition" again became a coercive method by the 
German FM Genscher in late August. FM Genscher threatened to 
recognize Slovenia and Croatia "in the defined borders" (FBIS-WEU. 
26.Aug.1991? p.18), if the violence was not halted. Italy also 
tried to use this threat, plus the threat of sanctions, to gain 
compliance by Serbia to a cease-fire and the removal of troops as 
was stipulated under the first EC "troika" agreement (FBIS-WEU. 
3.Sept.1991? p.1).
Between the outbreak of Violence in June and the opening of
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the peace talks in September, there were a variety of initiatives 
put forth by the CSCE and EC. At the beginning of July there were 
also informal talks with the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Javier 
Perez de Cuellar, and between the countries of Europe, about 
bringing the U.N. into the Yugoslav crisis fFBIS-WEU. 1.July.1991? 
p.21).
By the end of July is was evident that the EC “troika" 
missions were not going to resolve the conflict, although it had 
achieved the three month moratorium on the independence declara­
tions by Slovenia and Croatia f ibid. ? p.3). On July 1st FM 
Genscher proposed suspending the EC's DM 1.7 bil. aid package to 
Yugoslavia (ibid.. p.21). This was announced on the fifth, along 
with an arms and military equipment embargo fFBIS-WEU. 5.July.1991? 
p.l) . And Austria began diplomatically investigating the possibil­
ity of bringing in the UN fFBIS-WEU. 5.July.1991? p.7). This last 
suggestion did not meet with great approval and was dropped for the 
time being.
The next large-scale initiative to be discussed (outside of 
finally extending the EC observer mission into Croatia fFBIS-WEU. 
30.July.1991? p.l]) was the idea of “European Blue Berets" fFBIS- 
WEU. 29.July.1991? p.4). This was a proposal for an EC peace­
keeping force to go to Yugoslavia. After some discussion the 
proposal was dismissed because such a force simply does not exist 
fFBIS-WEU. 1.Aug.1991? p.6? 7.Aug.1991? p.3). Thus, the EC knew 
early on in the conflict that diplomacy, diplomatic pressure and 
negotiation were the extent of their abilities under their existing
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security structures. This was followed by a proposal by the 
Western European Union to deploy a force, this suggestion also came 
up repeatedly during September's discussions with the U.H. and 
would eventually be dealt with in the U.N. Security Council. 
However, another suggestion came out of these initiatives, that the 
EC should sponsor a peace conference fFBIS-WEU. 7.Aug.1991; p.3). 
The conference did gain approval by the nations of the EC and the 
parties to the dispute. Held in The Hague, under the mediation of 
Lord Carrington, the last British President of the EC, the peace 
conference opened on the ninth of September (FBIS-WEU. 9.Sept.1991; 
p.2-4).
V
September of 1991 saw the two halves of Europe trying to come 
together and form a single foreign policy, the opening the EC- 
sponsored peace conference in The Hague, and initial involvement 
the United Nations. Yet there were still European countries who 
had objections to the German-lead recognition strategy, especially 
Greece, the UK, Italy, France and Russia.
As was typical of the rest of Eastern Europe (except Russia 
and Romania), the President of Hungary, Apad Goncz, supported the 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and supported the interna­
tional efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis in the EC and the 
CSCE. Yet he was also worried about the fate of minorities in 
Yugoslavia, especially the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. He
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also realized that Serbia's support of any peace plan— with or 
without recognition— was necessary (FBIS-WEU, 3.Sept.1991; p.21). 
Also, the Hungarian stance was similar to the other border states 
of Yugoslavia, in that they all renounced claims left over from 
either of the two world wars or even before 1914 fThe Insider. 
Nov. 1991; p.26-28) and they all declared to follow a policy of non­
interference, as long as the conflict did not spill over their 
border. Czechoslovak FM Dienstbier for his part, agreed, during a 
visit to Spain, with Spanish FM Fernandez-Ordonez that the 
Yugoslavian disintegration could cause "a splintering of Europe 
which could delay the unification of the continent and harm the 
Helsinki process1' (FBIS-WEU. 4.Sept. 1991; p.32).
The Czechoslovak government's attitude toward the Yugoslav 
crisis, and to reassure the Slovaks, was to emphasize the rights of 
Slovenia and Croatia to pursue self-determination. Although, early 
in the crisis, President Havel did not want to damage Czecho­
slovakia's new international prestige by undermining the perceived 
U.S. and EC policy of "territorial Integrity". Yet at the same 
time, President Havel wanted the rest of Europe to take a more 
attentive interest in the Yugoslav conflict, because as he saw it 
"[t]he danger that is coming from Yugoslavia may be deeper and 
bigger then the international community has realized." (The Globe. 
24.Oct.91). This oblique comment can be interpreted in many ways, 
historically— World War I began in the Balkans— and in a contempo­
rary sense, Yugoslavia may be indicative of ethno-territorial sub­
nationalism which could become (and in the former Soviet Union has
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become) an issue worth fighting and dying over in the many multi­
ethnic countries of Europe. When the EC began changing its 
position toward the crisis, specifically when Germany began more 
openly to support the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, this 
gave Havel more latitude in his own country's stance, as Germany's 
support was popular with most Czechs and Slovaks.
However, the Czechoslovak FM also said his country fears civil 
war in Yugoslavia, because it could spark a similar one between 
Czechs and Slovaks (FBIS-WEU, 4.Sept.1991; p.32). In retrospect, 
its very possible that the level of violence which occurred in 
Yugoslavia, and the degree of destruction to towns, roads and 
ethnic relations, plus the specter of refugees fleeing from the war 
should be sufficient deterrence to the Czechs and Slovaks as to 
prevent them from pursuing a similar path. Conversely, the outcome 
of the negotiations may prompt the Slovaks and Czechs to attempt an 
EC-mediated settlement first. The Yugoslav civil war, as an 
international crisis, should also prompt the CSCE, EC, and U.N., to 
each step in at their level of diplomacy and security competency to 
stridently prevent another such occurrence.
Although President Havel and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier 
condemned the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) for their attacks on 
Slovenia and their extended intervention into Croatia, the 
Czechoslovak government had decided to adopt a “wait and see” 
position, as they expected an “all-European solution” to the 
problem.
The EC-sponsored peace conference opened on the ninth of
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September 1991, and stuttered and sputtered throughout the rest of 
the year. Numerous cease-fires were attempted, yet none lasted 
more than a few hours. As the peace conference opened, German FM 
Genscher said that if the conference failed, that Germany would 
believe it necessary to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. If that 
became the case, he maintained, the UN Security Council would need 
to be convened on the situation, but that Germany would not 
recognize the republics on their own (FBIS-WEU. 9.Sept.1991? p.l). 
Germany was by this time fully committed, in word, to recognition, 
and the government was coming under increased domestic pressure to 
grant actual recognition to Slovenia and Croatia (FBIS-WEU, 
8.Oct.1991? p .5). Three steps which Germany took in November 
convinced the rest of Europe that the Germans might possibly 
recognize the two republics before the rest of the EC. The first 
step came on November sixth? Germany announced that it would open 
a consulate in Ljubljana--which would become an embassy upon 
recognition of that republic (FBIS-WEU. 6.Nov.1991? p.16). The 
next step was Germany's proclamation of their prerequisites for 
recognition. These prerequisites were: a commitment to the 
protection of minorities and the renunciation of violence in all 
border problem areas (FBIS-WEU. 8.Nov.1991? p.ll). But perhaps the 
most significant act which spelled out the intentions of Germany 
was the government's decision (contrary to Germany's November 9th 
statement that they would not Mact alone” [NYT, 9.Nov.1991]), on 
the 14th of November, to recognize the two Yugoslav republics 
before Christmas. Germany would not wait for a uniform EC
26
decision. Waiting, the Germans felt "would mean to remain inactive 
against one#s better judgement— and this would be irresponsible" 
(FBIS-WEU, 14.Nov.1991; p.13). It appears that this step would 
have been supported by the Danes, Belgians, Portuguese and the 
Luxembourgers, with Italy and other non-EC countries as other 
possible adherents.
In the beginning of December Germany began speaking more 
insistently about recognition of the two republics. Although the 
recalcitrance of the United Kingdom and Greece before and after the 
Maastricht Summit prevented the EC recognition of the two republics 
immediately after the summit fFBIS-WEU, 2.Dec.1991; p.12 ? 
12.Dec.1991; p.4 ? 5.Dec.1991; p.34), Germany continued to pursue 
immediate recognition. The other members ot the EC who did agree 
with recognition, but wanted a "Unified" stance, or a "Common 
Foreign Policy" (FBIS-WEU, 13.Dec.1991; p.2 ; 18.Dec.1991; p.5-6) 
tried to slow Germany with reason. They tried to point out that 
Germany itself, had said many times that unilateral recognition 
would not help Slovenian and Croatian independence. Germany, 
however, saw a different aspect. They envisioned recognition as 
the only way to end the civil war and get all of the parties to the 
dispute to a negotiating table were "serious" negotiations could 
take place (FBIS-WEU. 23.Dec.1991; p.15).
The UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd suggested alternatives 
to recognition and peace-keeping forces. He said that the EC 
should consider economic sanctions including an oil embargo against 
Yugoslavia, also, diplomatic isolation of the "Yugoslav" government
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should be contemplated besides a reinforcement of the arms embargo 
(FBIS-WBU, 20.Sept.1991? p.2). As for perce-keeping forces, he 
wanted to discourage the introduction of them, because the UK's 
view was Monce in, never out...” (FBIS-WEU. 23.Sept.1991? p.7). 
The United Kingdom held this view because of their own 22 year 
involvement in Northern Ireland. The Foreign Secretary admitted by 
the end of October that "Yugoslavia has collapsed.”, but that ”we 
have to look for other ways of exerting pressure” (FBIS-WEU. 
29.Oct.1991? p.7), i.e., other than U.N. forces or recognition. By 
mid-November, Britain had altered this policy and, together with 
France and Belgium, began to urge the U.N. Security Council ”to 
dispatch a peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia if the warring Serbian 
and Croatian factions will agree to a lasting cease-fire” (NYT. 
14.Nov.1991.). This support of U.N. peace-keepers would remain a 
part of British policy.
Greece was still (and would continue to) ardently supporting 
a unified Yugoslavia in September. At very least, Greece wanted 
Yugoslavia to remain as a loose confederation [A viewpoint Europe 
had abandoned or would soon abandon.) (FBIS-WEU, 20.Sept.1991? 
p. 24) .
Since September two issues have become "hot” in the Greeks 
foreign relations with the republic of Macedonia. Both are of 
grave concern to the Greek government. One is the situation of the 
border. Since the federal government of Yugoslavia is all but 
dissolved, and Serbia's attentions are focused primarily on the war 
with Croatia, and secondarily on Kosovo, the security of the border
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between Greece and Yugoslav Macedonia has become at times almost 
non-existent. Also, the Yugoslav Macedonian declaration of 
independence greatly worries the Greek government because much of 
Greece's northern provinces are inhabited by Macedonians, Greek 
Macedonians. Greece fears that this porous border will allow 
Yugoslav Macedonians who wish to promote reunification of all the 
lands of Macedonia, free access to agitate within Greece. Unlike 
the Macedonian area in Yugoslavia, Greek Macedonia is relatively 
prosperous.
The government of Greece fears that an independent Macedonia 
would either cause or encourage a separatist movement within their 
country. Already there are tensions between Greece and Yugoslav 
Macedonia, stemming from ”independent” Macedonia's currency. The 
Greek government does not object to them having their own currency, 
but they do object to having a Greek national monument in Thessa- 
lonika, Greece, pictured on the bills. This monument is rumored to 
be one of the remnants of Alexander the Great's era. At one time 
this castle was a part of MMacedoniaM, situated in a city that is 
still known to Yugoslavs as Solun (Thessalonika). Thus, the Greek 
government views the use of this monument as a symbol on the 
currency of another country, as a provocative act.
Despite the fact that Greece would desire a unified Yugosla­
via, the government said it would definitely not recognize a state 
that used the name “Macedonia11 fFBIS-WEU. 20.Sept. 1991; p.24). The 
Greeks stood by their threat when the EC took up the discussion of 
recognizing Macedonia in mid-December and January.
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In mid~September Italian FM de Michelis stated that Italy 
would recognize the borders of Slovenia and Croatia ”if the 
conflict were to degenerate into open warfare with the Federal 
Army's full participation in support of Serbia” (FBIS-WEU, 
1.Oct.1991; p. 12). Italy was still concerned with territorial 
integrity and protection for the Serbian minority in Croatia. The 
Foreign Minister, when asked about Italy's vulnerability in the 
crisis, believed that only direct attacks in Bosnia-Hercegovina or 
Kosovo would constitute the greatest threat. They soon found out 
that a naval attack on Dubrovnik (the old Italian city of Ragusa 
and a Croatian coastal city) would comprise an even greater risk. 
The Foreign Minister felt that the EC was the best way to achieve 
a solution, through diplomacy and negotiation. He left recognition 
as a last resort (FBIS-WEU. 4 .Oct.1991? p.29). FM de Michelis and 
Italy reached the decision that there was ”no alternative” to 
recognition, in November, and stated that recognition should come 
in two months (FBIS-WEU. 1.Nov.1991; p.17). In November, Italian 
President Francesco Cossiga became the first head of state to visit 
Slovenia since their independence declaration of October 8, 1991 (a 
day after the three month moratorium expired). Officially the 
President said that he was not conferring political recognition on 
Slovenia by this act, but in fact, it was taken as political 
recognition by the rest of the world. Another meeting which helped 
to create the impression that Italy was conferring tacit recogni­
tion was the meeting between FM de Michelis and Croatian FM 
Zvonimir Separovic a few days before President Cossiga's visit. In
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this meeting FM de Michelis and FM Separovic discussed concrete 
issues such as: Italy's granting of future credits co Croatia; 
completing current projects; conducting consular functions; 
promoting new forms of cooperation; and Italy's defense of minority 
rights within the republic of Croatia (Report on Eastern Europe, 
51/52).
In the wake of the expiration of the three-month moratorium on 
independence by Slovenia and Croatia; their subsequent rein­
statements of their declaration; the frustrating experience of the 
CSCE process and the failures on the ground concerning the firm 
establishment of a cease-fire; the French government's position on 
recognition began to turn more favorably toward the recognition of 
those that have expressed this desire than it was three months 
previous. France, however, was adamant that recognition should not 
be subject to "individual initiatives or influences by the 
demagogic leanings of certain people" (FBIS-WEU, 8.Oct.1991; p.ll). 
The French FM Roland Dumas continually stressed the need for "a 
common stance by the Community" [EC] (ibid.) and tried to convince 
Germany (i.e. "certain people") of this need for cohesion.
VI
From September to the 18th of December (when Germany unilat­
erally recognized Slovenia and Croatia), the EC began to coordinate 
their policy. The main vehicle for this coordination was the EC- 
sponsored peace conference. The secondary vehicle were the steps
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taken to bring about U.N. intervention, at first non-militarily, 
and later, intervention by peace-keeping forces. Yet, regardless 
of the outcome of the peace negotiations, the concept of ••unity11, 
unity of EC policy, was a paramount concern of EC member states. 
The statement: "I want the 12 to act together, to speak with one 
voice, to make the same decisions. I would regret divisions over 
recognition. .. •• (FBIS-WEU. 8.Oct.1991; p.ll), or something 
expressing the same thought, was made by all the EC member states 
foreign ministers at one time or another.
In September the EC observers were deployed (NYT. 
2 .Sept. 1991.) . The impetus for unified action by the ,ftwelveM was 
not only because the European Comrunity is in the initial steps for 
political and economic integration, it was also an exercise in 
••realpol itik". As the Dutch FM Van den Broek said:
"Yugoslavia may well be a precedent of what we will see 
happening also in other parts of Europe. Therefore, I think 
that an utmost effort is justified to see to it that it is a 
peaceful solution, acceptable to all, also accepting that 
the present Yugoslavia is dead and that something new is 
needed, but that must be acceptable by all the peoples of 
Yugoslavia." (FBIS-WEU. 18.Sept.1991? p.2).
Considering the fact that Mr. Van den Broek was, at the time, the 
President of the EC's Council of Ministers, he seems to be voicing 
the concerns of all EC members and noting that the problems of the 
Yugoslav federation are not unigue to Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet Union (and now the Russian Federation) were also
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undergoing (and are undergoing) similar, although to different 
degrees, centripetal forces which threaten their federations. This 
statement also acknowledges the right of self-determination, and 
realizes that this principle is not, nor should it be, limited to 
federations. The various potential flashpoints in Europe, from 
Spain to Romania and beyond, may, unfortunately, be future issues 
that Europe as a whole will have to resolve.
The idea of continuing diplomatic pressure brought up by the 
British foreign secretary was also upgraded. The concept that 
changes within Yugoslavia would only become legitimate if they were 
accepted by Europe and the world community became prevalent during 
the fall of 1991. This was the accepted view of the combatants 
too, except Serbia who had always contended that the conflict was 
strictly internal. Consequently the questions about internal 
borders and partitioning of individual republics became a problem 
which the EC would have to address. A good example of the EC 
policy toward partitioning was stated by Italian FM de Michelis. 
He stated that the EC would Mnot accept the altering of borders 
through the use of force. Negotiation would be another matter.” 
(EBIfizHElZ, 1.Oct. 1991? p. 12) .
In mid-October, the EC integrated into one of the peace plan 
proposals what they hoped would not only resolve the Yugoslav 
conflict successfully, but would also result in recognition of all 
of the Yugoslav republics. The proposal would allow the recogni­
tion of the Yugoslav republics, and offer essentially associate 
status to the republics ”as a preliminary step...to their incorpo­
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ration into the European Common Market”. In return, the EC wanted 
an end to the war and the retention of ’'minimum links of union as 
well as the existence of common institutions” (FBIS-WEU. 18.Oct.- 
1991; p.3). The offer of Associate status was something Yugoslavia 
had been hoping for and the EC was banking on this as an effective 
diplomatic "carrot” which would neatly resolve the conflict. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case.
By the end of October the EC was growing impatient with the 
continued fighting, while the leaders were at the peace conference 
table or signing cease-fire agreements. Showing their collective 
exasperation, French FM Dumas declared that "the Community now 
intends to take decisions of a more coercive nature.... The 
Community intends to toughen up its position." (FBIS-WEU. 29.Oct.- 
1991? p.l). In November, the EC began seriously contemplating 
economic sanctions (FBIS-WEU. 5.Nov.1991? p.l). Even here, the EC 
was having problems reaching a 100% unified position. While still 
in the discussion stage, some of the EC members were seeking some 
"positive action" for those republics cooperating with the EC.
By November 7th the EC decided that any party that did not 
accept the peace agreement they had set out would be subject to 
economic and political sanctions. These sanctions would include 
restrictions on energy supplies, in particular crude oil (Eastern 
Europe Newsletter. 4.Nov.1991? p.5). As the pipeline between 
Croatia and Serbia had already been turned off, by Croatia earlier 
in the conflict, these sanctions would be only effective if other 
countries outside the EC countries also were determined not to sell
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oil to the combatants. Specifically these would be Romania, Greece 
and the former Soviet republics. By this time, Romania and Greece 
were already supplying "some alternative oil supply routes” (ibid..
p. 6) .
Germany on the other hand was pushing for Serbia's isolation 
by the sanctions, while the Dutch FM wanted to include Croatia in 
this isolation, because it was not adhering to the mid-October 
cease-fire (FBIS-WEU, 12.Nov.1991? p.3). The economic sanctions 
were agreed to on the 15th of November, and went into affect on the 
21st. The sanctions included “limits on imports of Yugoslav 
textiles, stripped Yugoslavia of trade benefits*' provided by the 
"General System of Preferences and suspended Yugoslavia from 
participation in an economic recovery program [the PHARE Program] 
for Eastern Europe that is backed by 24 Western countries" (NYT, 
9.Nov.1991.).
Even before the sanctions were agreed to by the EC, Serbia 
made sure that it had secured alternative sources of trade and 
international support. Diplomatically, Russia opposed the EC's 
economic embargo (FBIS-EEU. 5.Nov.1991? p.30) and had also agreed 
to try to continue supplying Serbia with oil (FBIS-EEU, ?7.Nov.- 
1991? p.34), along with Iran and Libya. Serbia had also held talks 
with the People's Republic of China and made agreements on 
cooperating "in the areas of agriculture, the chemical industry, 
and especially the pharmaceutics industry" (FBIS-EEU. 13.Nov. 19-91; 
p • 3 3) . Additionally, a joint venture was concluded with the USSR 
to build a chemical plant in Serbia (FBIS-EEU, 14.Nov.1991? p.37),
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one d a y  b e f o r e  t h e  EC a g re e d  t o  im p le m e n t s a n c t io n s  on t h e  SFRY. 
As th e  S e r b ia n  g o v e rn m e n t s o u g h t and  fo u n d  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  goods  
fro m  w e s te rn  E u ro p e ,  in  a n o th e r  t y p i c a l  m ove, t h e  " p ro - S e rb ” 
Y u g o s la v  A rm y c ho se  t h e  1 5 th  as t h e  d a y  t o  anno unce  t h e i r  a g re e m e n t  
t o  p e a c e - k e e p in g  f o r c e s  NYT, 1 5 . N o v . 1 9 9 1 . ) • 1
Outside the EC, Switzerland introduced its own sanctions 
against the whole SFRY, and urged other European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) members to do the same (FBIS-WEU. 13.Nov.1991; 
p . 4 5) . The other EFTA members, Austria, Finland, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden, did so on November 18th (FBIS- 
WEU, 18.Nov.1991? p.l). The Swiss also left open the option of 
taking further measures against those republics who were working 
against a political resolution to the crisis.
Whereas other Central and Last European governments are 
courting the EC for membership, aid, and good-will, Romania has 
definitely been attempting to chart its own course. On November 
15th 1991, while other countries were standing behind the EC's 
economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, Romania refused because, as 
President Iliescu said, it would "present extremely difficult 
problems for our [the Romanian) economy” (Report on Eastern Europe. 
51/52, p .30) .
A day before this statement, on the 14th, Radio Bucharest 
described YPA troops attacking the town of Vukovar as "liberators” 
(ibid.). Other countries had by this time condemned these 
gratuitous acts of destruction. Also, two days after Iliescu's 
statement, on the 17th, after talks with the Serbian Prime Minister
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Dragutif; Zelenovic, the Romanian Prime Minister Stolojan (Petre 
Roman's replacement), announced that Romania would be willing to 
mediate in the Yugoslav civil war (FBIS-EEU. 29.Hov.1991; p.20). 
This, months after the EC's attempt at mediating a resolution to 
the dispute through a Peace Conference in the Hague; U.H. observers 
had been dispatched to the country; numerous EC and U.H. mediated 
cease-fires; and after the U.H General Secretary, Perez de Cuellar 
had sent his own envoy, Cyrus Vance to the country to try to 
prevent a further escalation of the crisis. It is amazing that 
after a few days of talks with only the Serbian Prime Minister, 
that Romania could decide that they were not only willing, but 
able, to do what all these other internetional organizations had, 
to that point, been unable to do.
Hence, the Romanian policy toward Yugoslavia appears ambigu­
ous, if not outright contradictory. The "official” policy states 
that Romania is determined to avoid any involvement, political or 
militarily. The Romanian government stresses that the federal 
government of Yugoslavia should be preserved in one form or 
another. Primarily because they fear that the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia could affect the political balance of the region, and 
exacerbate the separatist tendencies among ethnic minorities, in 
Romania and the region.
Czechoslovakia too, chose to make a distinction between their 
economic policy and that of the EC. Perhaps the delegation was 
looking toward Yugoslavia and seeing their own potential conflict. 
On the 18th of Hovember, in the Serbian parliament a Czech Rational
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Council delegation stated that it was Hnot bound to honour the 
European Community embargo against Yugoslavia ... [but that it was] 
in the interest of Czechoslovakia that the embargo on the deliver­
ies of arms to Yugoslavia should be fully respected" (FBIS- 
EEU. 19.Nov. 1991: p.34). This stance was understandable since, they 
too, would not want to see an embargo on their goods, but would 
want to prevent gun-running into their country in the event of an 
outbreak of violence.
V I I
The actions of Germany from mid-November to mid-December, when 
Germany unilaterally rc gnized Slovenia and Croatia, was watched 
with severe trepidation by the countries of Europe, the U.S. and 
the U.N. Some of the statements by the individual countries of 
Europe were mentioned earlier. Other EC nations working on 
bringing the peace-keeping forces into Yugoslavia also issued joint 
statements, as did Lord Carrington (mediator of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia), the U.S. and the U.N. Secretary General, Hr. Javier 
Perez de Cuellar. A statement by the British government appears to 
sum up the attitudes of individual countries intent on not only a 
unified EC stance, but a unified European stance: "The position of 
the British government is crystal clear. At this moment not all of 
the requirements for independence has been filled by Slovenia and 
Croatia." (Dnevnik. December 16, 1991). Specifically, one of these 
requirements was the petition for recognition to be filed with the
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EC by the 23rd of December. Also, the EC had just delivered an 
announcement which said that after this petition was filed, they 
would then be reviewed, and those applications which proved their 
legitimacy under the "scrutiny” of international law and the 
requirements set out by the EC would be recognized on January 15th 
(EBIS-MEU , 17.Dec.1991? p.3-4).
Members of the EC, Britain and France, were also "pressing the 
Security Council to adopt a new resolution on the crises • •.that 
would dispatch United Nations military observers to Yugoslavia as 
quickly as possible" (NVT. 13.Dec.1991.). The reason for this 
initiative was two-fold: One, to effect greater involvement of the 
Security Council in the Yugoslav conflict and? by affecting this 
involvement, stop Chancellor Kohl's pledge to recognize "Slovenia 
and Croatia by Christmas" (ibid.). Britain and France (and other 
EC member states) believed that this recognition would risk: 
"sabotaging current peacemaking efforts"? "increase the fighting by 
encouraging the Croatian leader, Franjo Tudjman, to seek foreign 
military assistance"? "igniting violence in Bosnia-Hercegovina" 
and? would be seen as a reward and "would be giving encouragement 
to all the ethnic separatist forces...in Eastern Europe and the 
[then] disintegrating Soviet Union" (ibid.).
Lord Carrington, since December 2nd, had tried to stop 
Germany's unilateral recognition of the two republics. As the 
official in charge of the EC's Conference on Yugoslavia, which had 
been trying since early September to peacefully resolve the 
dispute, he warned that "separate acts by Germany 'would undoubt­
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edly mean the breakup of the conference'" (ibid.). Lord Carrington 
felt this act would drive Serbia away from the conference and would 
cause despondency in the republics of Slovenia and Croatia* The 
EC's credibility was already naturally damaged with Serbia because 
of their outspoken stance on recognition, and Lord Carrington 
believed that unilateral recognition by Germany would erode the 
last of Serbia's belief in the possibility of reaching a fairly 
negotiated international solution to their Minternal problems”*2 
He also felt that, in more tangible terms, this act would strength­
en the resolve of the Serbian government and the YPA to stand in 
possession of as much of Croatia as was possible in order to have 
a better bargaining position if the conference continued (ibid.).
The United States and the U.N. Secretary General also tried to 
put diplomatic pressure on Germany to prevent their recognition of 
the two republics. They feared that Germany's act could "destroy 
the peace-making efforts of the European Community and the United 
Nations”. The Secretary General said that he was "deeply worried 
that any early selective recognition could widen the present 
conflict and fuel an explosive situation.” (ibid*). The Security 
Council collectively attempted to adopt a resolution warning 
countries not to "disturb the political balance in Yugoslavia by 
taking unilateral actions".
When Germany did recognize the two republics it took about a 
week for the other EC countries to formulate their responses to the 
action, despite prior knowledge. The time lag was due to the fact 
that the other eleven did not want to alienate either the parties
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to the dispute or Germany, the largest country in Europe (FBIS-WEU, 
23.Dec.1991? p.15). It also took Serbia quite a few days to admit 
to their citizens that this act had indeed happened. To my own 
surprise, the article was but a footnote albeit on the front page. 
Yet, the announcement was presented as if recognition had occurred 
the previous day and not on the eighteenth fDnevnik. 24.Dec. 1991.). 
Perhaps by making the announcement a mere footnote it was felt that 
the psychological affect would be diminished.
VIII
The U.N. was consulted early on in the crisis (FBIS-WEU.
1. July.1991? p.21). U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar 
was asked at this time whether or not there would be military 
missions going to Yugoslavia. He replied that the problem was an 
internal one. Nor would he contemplate sending U.N. observers to 
Slovenia, because Slovenia was not a member of the U.N. (FBIS-WEU.
2. July.1991? p.2). Despite this attitude, the EC countries began 
thinking that the U.N. was the very place to refer the situation 
(FBIS-WEU. 5.Aug.1991; p.2 ? 6.Aug.1991; p.2 ? 7.Aug.1991? p.l).
After the "European Blue Berets" idea was rejected because 
such troops within the EC were non-existent (FBIS-WEU. 1.Aug.1991; 
p.6 ? 7.Aug.1991? p.3), the suggestion was not totally dropped. It 
was picked up by the WEU (Western European Union) • The WEU, 
theoretically, is Western Europe's combined armed forces organiza­
tion; however, in practice it is a paper tiger. The WEU wanted to
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deploy troops under the auspices of the CSCE or another interna­
tional organization (Poland and Czechoslovakia felt this suggestion 
was acceptable fFBIS-WEU. 17.Sept.1991; p.2])• As the EC 
continued the talks with Yugoslavia in The Hague, amongst them­
selves the EC discussed the possibility of engaging the U.N. in the 
conflict— either in negotiations or as peace-keepers (FBIS-WEU. 
18.Sept.1991; p.1-2).
In mid-September, Austrian FM Mock asked his Ambassador to the 
U.N. to formally request the U.N. to take up the Yugoslav topic 
(FBIS-WEU. 17.Sept.1991; p.3). Meanwhile, individual countries 
reacted to the suggestion of a WEU force. Tv UK was the most 
reserved. They felt that this would only be a possibility if a 
cease-fire was observed and if peace-ke< ers were requested by the 
combatants. Although France approved of bringing the political 
situation to the U.N. (FBIS-WEU. 18.Sept.1991; p.1-2), other coun­
tries wanted the approval of the entire CSCE members first 
(including therefore, Yugoslavia)•
France wanted the peace-keepers to be a EUROPEAN force, 
including the U.N. only if necessary, but conceded that a combined 
U.N./WEU force was possible. Germany viewed the WEU as only a 
possible buffer force, deployment being contingent on the agreement 
of the conflicting parties, and the observation of a cease-fire. 
Germany, however, would not participate because their Constitution 
limits their ability to deploy forces to the NATO area (ifeisL.). 
Italy favored such a buffer force and would participate.
A joint communique on Yugoslavia by the "twelve" at the end of
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September did not mention the possibility of a WEU force because of 
opposition from the UK. The other eleven felt this prospect could 
be mentioned, but for the sake of consensus they reduced their 
aspirations. It was decided that if WEU troops were sent that the 
WEU would need a mandate from the CSCE, the UN Security Council, 
the EC and all the Yugoslav parties to the dispute (FBIS-WEU. 
20.Sept.1 9 9 1? p.1).
The Austrian request to the UN was still being '’considered” 
when German FM Genscher called for an emergency session of the UN 
Security Council on the situation in Yugoslavia. This move was 
supported by France, Austria and Canada (FBIS-WEU, 20.Sept.1 9 9 1? 
p.8) . By the 2 3rd of September it was decided that the Security 
Council would meet to discuss Yugoslavia, although it would not 
take up the topic of peace-keeping forces (NYT. 23.Sept.1 9 9 1.). 
Other statements that appeared on this day were urging the UN to 
step in as a peace-keeper. For instance, the Belgium FM Eyskens 
acknowledged that the EC was essentially an economic power, but not 
a military one. Therefore "that shows we need more than Europe." 
(FBIS-WEU, 23.Sept.1 9 9 1; p.6). The UK agreed that the UN should be 
involved as peace-keepers, but should not be peace-makers (ifeidLJ . 
Peace-making should be achieved through diplomacy and negotiation, 
and thus through the CSCE and the EC.
Germany felt that due to the escalation of the war, that only 
now, could the UN act effectively (ibid.. p.8). Poland agreed that 
UN peace-keepers would be effective— Poland would even participate- 
-although the issue of independence aspirations should be met with
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a common foreign policy by al l.Qf .EurOBS (Ifeldt , P-22). Spain
feared that the conflict could spread throughout the Balkans and 
trusted the mechanisms of the UN to find a solution (ibid., p.23). 
Austria, Luxembourg, and Hungary were also in favor of UN initia­
tives, including peace-keeping forces fFBlS-WEU, 24.Sept.1991? 
p • 3) •
French President Francois Mitterrand stated that the UN 
Security Council must now deal with the issue of Yugoslavia and 
because France was the current Security Council Chairman (in 
September) , that he expected the Council to take up the issue 
before the end of September (FBIS-WEU. 23.Sept.1991? p.10). The 
next day, French FM Dumas suggested steps for the UN to take in the 
SFRY crisis. One, support the political actions of the EC; two, 
work to achieve a cease-fire under UN authority? three, impose an 
embargo on weapons deliveries; and four, provide a buffer force- 
one that would be there to keep the peace, once there was a 
cesscssion of hostilities, and only be deployed with the agreement 
of the Yugoslav parties (FBIS-WEU. 24.Sept.1991? p.13).
Although many of the countries were ready to hand over the 
prospect of a buffer force to the UN, the UN was not prepared to 
take up this task. The EC's foreign ministers therefore arrived at 
four hypotheses for strengthening their position in Yugoslavia. 
The first hypothesis was to send unarmed logistical support with 
the EC observers; second, send a group of lightly armed troops to 
protect the observers? the third proposition was to send 6,000- 
8,000 troops to "hot spots" to prevent cease-fire violations; the
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last proposal was to send an extended operation of 20,000 troops, 
with a 10,000 support staff for Ma mission of 'maintaining peace in 
Yugoslavia'" (FBIS-WEU. 4.Oct.1991; p.l ; 23.Oct.1991; p.l).
These discussions on an EC/WEU force, subject to a mandate by 
the UN, continued throughout October. Meanwhile the EC contem­
plated economic sanctions. The EC even wanted to coordinate 
sanctions with the UN. The member states of the EC realized that 
an EC embargo would only be binding on their members, while a UN 
embargo would bind all nations (FBir.-WEU. 5.Nov. 1991; p.l).
In the beginning of November the WEU, again, proposed to send 
peace-keepers, but this motion was rejected by Serbia (FBIS-WEU. 
6.Nov.1991; p.14-16) because Serbia, and Yugoslavia, were not 
members of the EC or the WEU. Then to many people's surprise, 
Serbia and its allies agreed with the Croatian leadership to call 
in international peace-keeping forces (FBIS-WEU. 13.Nov.1991; p.l 
; NYT, 14.Nov.1991.). Frarce, Britain and Belgium, seeking to 
capitalize on this change of policy by Serbia, urged the UN 
Security Council to "dispatch a peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia, 
if tne warring Serbian and Croatian factions [would] agree co a 
lasting cease-fire." (NYT. 14.Nov.1991.). These nations thought 
that this change of policy constituted the necessary approval of 
the combatants.
Despite the fact that the UN arranged cease-fire of November 
23rd (arranged by UN envoy Cyrus Vance, who was appointed to this 
position as a result of the Security Council meeting in September 
and UN Security Council Resolution 713), did not endure, the
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Security Council adopted Resolution 721, which allowed the 
development of a UN peace-keeping mission to be sent to Yugoslavia 
(fBIS-SEy, 29.Nov.1991; p.26).
Throughout December, while individual countries of Europe, the 
EC, the CSCE, and the UN were first contending with the eventuality 
of unilateral German recognition of the two republics and then the 
fallout of that recognition? the UN and the EC were devising ways 
to continue pursuing a resolution to the conflict. Thus, through 
December and January the current triple-tract approach was being 
revised and refined.
The '•triple-tract” approach divides the primary responsi­
bilities of the conflict. These duties are: diplomacy and diplo­
matic pressure? negotiation? and attempting to maintain the peace 
on the ground, Although the CSCE, EC, and UN try to perform all 
three of these obligations, they have basically been divided like 
this: the CSCE is the main tenet for diplomatic pressure? the EC 
is conducting the negotiations? and the UN is taking care of the 
peace-keeping functions (Interview with Heather Hurlburt).
IX
On January 3, 1992, U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance was able to gain 
signatories to the 15th cease-fire (FBIS-EEU. 1.Jan.1992? p.25). 
Despite numerous cease-fire violations, this cease-fire is 
considered to have endured. The cease-fire is between Serbia and 
Croatia, and does not include other republics such as Bosnia-
Hercegovina. The cease-fire envisioned the ability of the U.N. to 
deploy "Blue Hats” in three key areas of Croatia: Eastern Slavonia; 
Western Slavonia? and in the Krajina (ibid. \. With this cease-fire 
and the prospective ability of the U.N. to deploy troops should 
have and did, temporarily, give the negotiations mediated by the EC 
a boost (FBIS-EEU. 3.Jan.1992? p.26). Yet on the 7th of January it 
appeared that the cease-fire, the EC observer mission, and even EC 
participation in the conflict, was in jeopardy when one of the 
helicopters carrying five observers was shot down. This, however, 
did not occur. On the thirteenth of January, the EC monitoring 
mission linked up with the U.N. observers to facilitate cooperation 
between the two missions (FBIS-EEU. 14.Jan.1992? p.32), and to 
provide greater personal security to the members of the EC mission 
by lending them international credibility. The Bulgarian journal­
ist Petko Vulkov could have told them that this would not insure 
any extra security. He stated his opinion on the prospect of 
safety for "Blue Hats" in early October: "...the Croats and even 
less so the Serbs would hardly think twice about pulling the 
trigger on Blue Helmets who get into their cross hairs while they 
are busy killing each other." (Vulkov, p.28).
The wave of recognition began on the 13th of January when the 
Vatican recognized Slovenia and Croatia, and Estonia recognized 
Croatia (having recognized Slovenia earlier). This move was 
decried by Italy and Serbia (CIS Today. 13.Jan.1992; p.21). This 
action also did not derail the recognition train, and on January 
IS, 1992, the other eleven members of the EC (Germany recognised
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the two republics on December 18, 1991), Austria, Switzerland, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and other 
nations of the world recognized Slovenia and Croatia. Czechoslova­
kia recognized the republics the next day (RFL/RL Research Report. 
24.Jan.1992; p.76-77 ? Warsaw Voice. 26.Jan.1992; p.4).
Before reading the Dnevnik daily newspaper from Novi Sad, for 
the 16th of January, I had expected to find propaganda decrying the 
♦•Western imperialists*1 and their desire to destroy the '‘Yugoslav 
state1', but I also thought they would selectively reprint the 
statements of recognition by various countries. What I found was 
quite interesting. Belgium's statement was reported briefly as 
"Belgium recognized Croatia and Slovenia", and Austria's recogni­
tion announcement was reported twice, once as, "Euphoria in 
Austria" and again simply as "Austria recognized Slovenia and 
Croatia" (Dnevnik. 16.Jan.1992; p.12-13). As with the "article" on 
Germany in December, all three of these "articles" were barely more 
than three sentences each. The front page article about EC 
recognition was entitled, "The 'twelve' recognized Slovenia and 
Croatia: Bosna and Hercegovina and Macedonia did not fulfill the 
Community's requirements for recognition of their independence" 
(ibid., p.l). This article made sure to mention the "delicate" 
unity of the "twelve"; the influence of Germany in the recognition 
process; and that the recognition of Croatia only came after the 
Hague Peace Conference Arbitration Tribunal gave its "reserved" 
acceptance to Croatia's application. In actuality this Arbitration 
Tribunal had decided in mid-December (before German recognition)
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that "Yugoslavia definitely no longer exists and...that the 
residual parts are equal successors! i.e. there is no question of 
secessionists" (Eastern Europe H w aUAtAT* 18.Dec. 1992? p.6).
The most notable European nations which did not recognize 
Slovenia and Croatia on either the 15th or the 16th were Romania 
and Russia. Romania would do so on the 18th of January (RFE/RL 
Research Report. 31.Jan.1992; p.75), but not without making sure 
that at least Serbia would know that they were not only recognizing 
the republics that desired to express their self-determination in 
the form of independence; they were also recognizing the self- 
determination of those republics who chose to remain in a federa­
tion or confederation (Dnevnik. 16.Jan.1992; p.12).
Russia's attitude about recognition was the same as it had 
been for the previous six months, cautious and distant. Throughout 
the months of diplomatic gymnastics, the Soviet Union (and then 
Russia) understandably remained more of a side-line observer. Only 
in mid-October did the Soviet Union step into the main arena when 
(the then) President Mikhail Gorbachev invited the leaders of 
Serbia and Croatia (but not the Federal officials, thus tacitly 
acknowledging their lack of power) to Moscow, to attempt to 
negotiate a resolution to the conflict (Hew York Times. 16.Oct.- 
1991.). This "settlement" also broke down within hours.
Consequently, the Soviet Union and Russia removed themselves 
from the situation except to occasionally call for a peaceful 
resolution and unity. With respect to discussions and actions in
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the CSCE and U.N., they tended to abide by the decisions of the EC 
lead coalition.
Even the Russian statement on recognition, which came on the 
tenth of February 1992, tried to assure their longstanding ally, 
Serbia, that this recognition did not condone the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, it was simply facing the facts. At the same time the 
Russian Federation wanted to clarify their position (to their 
Serbian allies), and to give their impression of the actions taken 
by the EC and the U.N., especially the introduction of U.N. peace­
keeping forces.
Russia said that it wa?ited to make sure that the countries of 
Europe, especially the EC nember states, Belgrade, Ljubljana, and 
Zagreb knew that recognition does not solve tha problems of the 
Yugoslavs, that "operation 'Blue Helmets' does not have to replace, 
nor is it a recipe for a political resolution to the crisis in the 
country, nor is it a concrete road to the conclusion to the 
questions of the territorial minorities and their rights in 
Croatia". The statement went on to warn Europe and the Yugoslavs 
that to give in to the "tendency to isolate the Serbs is (an 
exercise] in religious dogma and stereotypical, and as such is an 
ideological cliche". The Russian statement closed with an outline 
of their particular brand of recognition: "We recognize the choice 
of the republics, which secede from the SFRY while recognizing the 
choice of those who intend to remain in the Yugoslav Federation. 
We will develop with Yugoslavia and enter into with her republics 
all-around cooperation and finally we will henceforth continue to
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work all of our efforts toward a lasting peace that will return 
peace to Yugoslav land with which there has been friendly rela­
tions.” (CIS Today. 10.Feb.1992; p.35-36).
X
Individual countries, worried about not only their own 
security, but the security of Europe moved quickly to involve two 
regional organizations, the EC and the CSCE, in an effort to 
immediately prevent war on the European continent and resolve the 
Yugoslav dispute. It appeared, that such a quick intervention by 
the EC would yield swift results. Unfortunately, it soon was 
evident that the Yugoslav imbroglio was far beyond the present 
scope of EC capabilities.
When the war broke out, the EC warned that it would not 
recognize the republics of Slovenia or Croatia. In fact the most 
of the international community stressed that it would withhold 
recognition until a settlement occurred between the combatants, or 
until there was an exhaustion of peace efforts. The general line 
of the EC was also that while Yugoslavia sorted its own internal 
affairs, it should remain a single unit in international relations 
(i.e. the United Nations, adhering to bi- and multi-lateral 
treaties)•
The EC immediately condemned the YPA's attempt to ”secure” the 
borders of Slovenia, after Slovenia's declaration of intention to 
become independent. Less than two weeks later, the EC helped to
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negotiate the removal of YPA troops from the republic of Slovenia. 
By July 7th, the EC under their envoy, Lord Carrington, met with 
the federal government and the principle republican governments on 
the island of Brioni, and were able to gain the agreement of the 
parties to a three month moratorium on the independence declare* 
tions.
Despite the fact that fighting was continuing in the Croatian 
republic (clashes broke out less than a week after the attack on 
Slovenia), Lord Carrington organized a Peace Conference in The 
Hague. It was not only that there was no "peace" in Yugoslavia, 
but the increasing evidence that the situation was not as simple as 
originally thought. This frustrated the efforts of the "Peace 
Conference" to resolve the conflict.
What became increasingly clear to the EC and the rest of the 
international community, was that the "interested parties" in the 
conflict were not only the Federal Government, Serbia, Croatia, and 
Slovenia, but also the Yugoslav People's Army, at times, various 
branches of the armed forces (the Air Force, or different units 
stationed in countless areas undergoing turmoil), and the Krajina 
area, their government, and the authorities which are commanding 
the numerous insurgent groups. Given this convoluted situation, 
obtaining agreement to actions proposed by the EC is no easy task.
Four key issues have prevented an effective EC resolution to 
the Yugoslav crisis. First, some of the Yugoslav negotiators, in 
1991, were only playing for time. This statement is not only aimed 
at the Serbian government or the Army, although the belief that
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they weald win by force in time certainly applies to both groups. 
Second, there were conflicting interests within EC member countries 
as is apparent in the above sections. Third, the EC has, as yet, 
no structures to implement their decisions. There is no interna­
tional legal precedent or authority for the EC to intervene in what 
is "technically" an "internal" problem. The EC has no armed forces 
of their own, nor does the EC have the authority to call up troops 
from member states to intervene. Fourth, throughout much of 1991 
the EC was unable to obtain support from other international bodies 
to intercede effectively, although there were attempts.
Thus to say that this conflict was out of the scope of the 
EC's capabilities is not to minimize their efforts, present or 
future. The EC itself is still trying to find its balance when it 
comes to constructing and coordinating a unified political policy. 
This lack of coherency is what led to its apparent "failures" in 
dealing with the Yugoslav conflict. Coordinating twelve countries 
individual foreign policies, given their different national 
interests is not simple, as the EC has no doubt found out.
The EC and individual states also tried to involve the Council 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with the same 
results. The Yugoslav crisis has also pointed out serious 
shortcomings in some of its new institutions. For instance, the 
CSCE's crisis-management mechanism (which was created by FM 
Dienstbier), the Conflict Prevention Center, and the ability of the 
Ministerial meetings in Prague were not empowered when they were 
designed, to prevent, or indeed unilaterally cope with a crisis of
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the magnitude of the Yugoslav civil war. Despite this, the CSCE 
seems to have found their niche, at least for the present. The 
CSCE is currently eminently qualified to use diplomacy and 
diplomatic pressure to "encourage” one of its members to accept 
what would not appear to be in their interest. Case in point, in 
order to permit the deployment of U.N. peace-keeping forces in the 
Krajina and Slavonia areas, Belgrade was "encouraged” to allow the 
entrance of Slovenia and Croatia into the CSCE, on March 24, 1992. 
Even more recently, the CSCE threatened to exclude Yugoslavia from 
the CSCE if they did not vote for the entrance of Bosnia-Hercego- 
vina [essentially "You're out, if they are not in."] (Interview 
with Heather Hurlburt, 30.April.1992.).
One could argue that the primary reason that the CSCE could 
not accomplish anything in regards to the Yugoslav conflict, was 
because the CSCE rules on issues by consensus. It is true that 
when the question of Yugoslavia came before the Council, Yugoslavia 
could and did block any serious proposals at intervention. This 
however, would ignore the fact that these institutions had not been 
designed to cope with a full-blown civil war. The Prevention 
Center was supposed to, but before the situation became untenable. 
When the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) was conceived and 
authorized the situation in Yugoslavia was perhaps at the point 
where the CPC could have helped. But as with any new program it 
took about a year to set up and staff. By the time the CPC was 
ready and able to deal with the conflict, it found that it was not 
only past the time of its usefulness, but also that the recommenda*
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tions it submitted would probably not be implemented, due to lack 
of funds and because the CSCE was not qiven any real, political or 
military, power. Clearly the CPC and other new institutions did 
not expect to be challenged so readily.
Although statements issued by the CSCE may appear to be weak-- 
because "consensus" opinions tend to be ones of the lowest common 
denominator— one should remember that this same ‘'consensus” is the 
force of agreement of (now) fifty-one nations, including four of 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The United Nations entrance into the Yugoslav crisis marks the 
first time since its founding that the U.N. became involved in a 
dispute on the European continent. The United Nations currently 
holds unique respect among the "2nd” and "3rd” world nations. And 
as for this particular conflict, the U.N. is the only international 
organization that commands the respect of all the combatants.
So, although "European Collective Security" has not yet been 
achieved, some headway has been made. Europe now knows that 
achieving political unity will require sacrifices of some pieces of 
their sovereignty, and each can now assess whether they are willing 
to make this sacrifice. Two important principles have been brought 
out: "strong international reaction against the use of force and 
international mediation when the internal process of negotiations 
has broken down" (Baltic Independent. 12-18.July.1991? p.l). Also, 
although Europe has not reached "indivisible and... inseparable" 
security, they are at least becoming aware of how long the road is 
to this goal.
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NOTES
This really has been a typical move. Every time the EC or 
the UN came up with another initiative which they felt would 
bring the sides to the bargaining table, the Serbian govern­
ment or the YPA would "give” a little on a point of contention 
from another time. The other typical occurrence, unfortunate­
ly, has been an increase in fighting every time a cease-fire 
was signed. Plus, of course, an upsurge in the propaganda 
war. These last two were commonalities of both sides of the 
conflict.
"The Serbian representatives assess that the E.C.'s political 
engagement has lost its legal value since the E.C. has 
abandoned the principles of the Brioni declaration and has 
over-stepped its mandate, initially limited to lending good 
offices.” (FBIS-EEU. 21. Jan. 1992? p.36). The Serbian
government felt that the EC's position and the ‘'problem of 
recognition should be treated within the framework of a 
comprehensive solution of the Yugoslav crisis and also within 
the framework of the UN Security Council Resolutions 713, 721, 
and 724 which appeal to all countries to refrain from action 
that may contribute to heightened tension.” (FBIS-EEU. 
16.Jan.1992; p.34).
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